Working Paper
This paper develops and tests the idea that consistent policy success for radical right parties across several immigration policy domains takes the rare confluence of multiple electoral conditions.
Abstract
Research has shown that stronger radical right parties often succeed in restricting immigrant integration and citizenship policies. We know much less about the conditions under which they also shape immigration policies regulating entry and stay. I argue that executive participation or electoral strength alone are insufficient for radical right parties to achieve policy success across both domains. Rather, greater legislative power translates into more restrictive immigration and citizenship policies only when immigration is highly salient in democratic elections. When immigration is not highly salient, even electorally successful radical right parties cannot consistently advance their preferred policies. I quantitatively test this hypothesis across three key policy dimensions and multiple operationalizations covering 23 Western democracies. The results show that consistent policy success across all dimensions occurs under the specified electoral conditions and that these conditions are rare. In addition, even under these conditions, radical right parties cannot fully close immigration regimes. This finding provides a political explanation for the nativist side of the immigration policy trilemma (exclusive citizenship combined with strong enforcement and semi-open immigration regimes) and significantly advances our understanding of radical right party influence in their core policy field.
Research has shown that stronger radical right parties often succeed in restricting immigrant integration and citizenship policies. We know much less about the conditions under which they also shape immigration policies regulating entry and stay. I argue that executive participation or electoral strength alone are insufficient for radical right parties to achieve policy success across both domains. Rather, greater legislative power translates into more restrictive immigration and citizenship policies only when immigration is highly salient in democratic elections. When immigration is not highly salient, even electorally successful radical right parties cannot consistently advance their preferred policies. I quantitatively test this hypothesis across three key policy dimensions and multiple operationalizations covering 23 Western democracies. The results show that consistent policy success across all dimensions occurs under the specified electoral conditions and that these conditions are rare. In addition, even under these conditions, radical right parties cannot fully close immigration regimes. This finding provides a political explanation for the nativist side of the immigration policy trilemma (exclusive citizenship combined with strong enforcement and semi-open immigration regimes) and significantly advances our understanding of radical right party influence in their core policy field.